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View the specification.
View theorem base summary,
View theorem base listing,
the used properties by spec,
the dependency list,
the symbol table,
enrich gen-secdomain-set
,
gen-execute with
predicates
inv : systemstate;
comment: system invariant;
. ⇒ . : secdomain × secdomain;
comment: security policy, interference relation;
eqd : systemstate × secdomain × systemstate;
comment: equivalence of systemstates w.r.t. secdomain;
axioms
eqd-refl : ⊦ eqd(sys, d, sys);
eqd-symm : ⊦ eqd(sys, d, sys0) → eqd(sys0, d, sys);
eqd-trans : ⊦ eqd(sys, d, sys0) ∧ eqd(sys0, d, sys1) → eqd(sys, d, sys1);
dom-equiv : ⊦ inv(sys) ∧ inv(sys0) ∧ eqd(sys, d, sys0) → (cdom(sys, co) ⇒ d ↔ cdom(sys0, co) ⇒ d);
dom-equal : ⊦ inv(sys) ∧ inv(sys0) ∧ eqd(sys, cdom(sys, co), sys0) → cdom(sys, co) = cdom(sys0, co);
locally-respects : ⊦ inv(sys) ∧ ¬ cdom(sys, co) ⇒ d0 → eqd(sys, d0, exec(sys, co) .1);
comment: Rushby Def. 4;
output-cons : ⊦ inv(sys) ∧ inv(sys0) ∧ eqd(sys, cdom(sys, co), sys0) → exec(sys, co) .2 = exec(sys0, co) .2;
comment: Rushby Def. 3;
weakly-step-consistent
: ⊦ inv(sys) ∧ inv(sys0) ∧ eqd(sys, d, sys0) ∧ eqd(sys, cdom(sys, co), sys0) → eqd(exec(sys, co) .1, d, exec(sys0, co) .1);
inv-init : ⊦ inv(initialstate);
inv-exec : ⊦ inv(sys) → inv(exec(sys, co) .1);
end enrich